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JAMES A. SERRITELLA, ESQUIRE
The increased demands for, and escalating costs of, our ever widen-
ing array of services from all levels of government have caused the gov-
ernment to feverishly search out new sources of revenue. The taxpayer
revolt mentality and the related dash of an interesting variety of individ-
uals and groups to the safe harbor of tax exemption have helped channel
the government's revenue search to tax exempt organizations. This search
has spawned an increase in the level of legislation and litigation, creating
great pressure on the tax exempt organization in the 1980's. Today, I will
focus my attention on real estate taxes and briefly highlight some recent
legislation and litigation.
A survey of legislation across the country indicates that the trend is
toward the legislatures' cutting back on some exemptions or at least scru-
tinizing them more closely in addition to requiring annual application for
exempt status.
The courts of the various states have consistently adopted a strict
construction approach to the laws exempting certain property from real
estate taxation. Although not a new one, this trend is accelerating.
Briefly, I will discuss five areas that may be of interest: first, the re-
quirement of ownership by a qualifying entity and the effects of leasing
all or part of otherwise qualifying property; second, the requirement of
exclusive use of property for religious purposes and its application to
property held for future use; third, the tax treatment of parsonages and
other residences of church members; fourth, the treatment of new reli-
gions; fifth, the imposition of user charges on exempt properties.
OWNERSHIP
Most states require the owner of the subject property, as a prerequi-
site to the granting of real estate tax exemption, to be a qualifying entity,
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that is, a charitable, religious, educational, or public body. That being the
case, it is possible that individuals or groups may try to meet the statu-
tory requirements by creating a mere impression of ownership.
For instance, in a Tennessee case, In re Appeal of the Church of God
at Memphis, the individuals who deeded the subject property to their
church continued to reside on the premises and to make monthly mort-
gage payments. Although the Assessment Appeals Commission denied ex-
emption on other grounds, it noted that it was influenced by the issue of
whether the church actually owned the property.
On the other hand, courts recognize the increasing use of forms of
conveyance which do not pass actual title to buyers at the time of convey-
ance, for example, contract sales accord ownership status when sufficient
rights and responsibilities of ownership are undertaken. For instance, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that an organization which made a downpay-
ment, substantial monthly payments, and which had assumed liability for
potential taxes was the owner of the property for exemption purposes.,
The ownership test may or may not be met in a situation where the
prior owner retains some rights in the property. In a Pennsylvania case,
the reservation of the right to live on and make use of the property for
life did not destroy its exempt status because the primary use of the
property, which had been conveyed to the state, was public. A contrary
result was reached by the Supreme Court of Maine in a case involving
reservation of rights of access.
Although, in many states, property which otherwise would be exempt
loses such status because it has been leased to a nonqualifying entity,
ownership by a qualifying entity does not guarantee exemption. For in-
stance, in 1979, Nevada enacted legislation which specifically states that
exempt property loses its exemption when leased to a profitmaking
organization.
Even without an explicit statutory basis for denying exempt status to
property owned by a qualifying organization and leased to a nonqualify-
ing entity, the courts have employed the almost universal statutory
formulation of "exclusive use" for qualifying purposes. For example, in
Mason District Hospital v. Tuttle," the Illinois court found a medical
center, which was owned by a tax exempt hospital and used by private
doctors pursuant to a license agreement, to be taxable due to its primarily
noncharitable use.
Leasing otherwise exempt property, however, is not necessarily fatal
to its tax exempt status. Where the owner is one type of exempt entity
and the lessee is a qualifying organization of another type, exemption
' Christian Action Ministry v. Department of Local Gov't Affairs, 56 Ill. App. 3d 102, 371
N.E.2d 1084 (1977), aff'd, 74 Ill. 2d 51, 383 N.E.2d 958 (1978).
' 61 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 378 N.E.2d 753 (1978).
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may still be granted. Several examples should be -noted. There is 1978
Florida legislation that maintained the tax exempt status for property
owned by a governmental entity and leased for strictly literary, charita-
ble, scientific, or religious purposes. There is 1977 California legislation
that granted exempt status to property owned by nonprofit organizations,
leased to the government and used solely for governmental purposes.
There is 1979 Colorado legislation that exempted property owned by gov-
ernmental entities and leased for use as a public airport, park, market, or
fairground.
Although leasing otherwise exempt property to a nonqualifying lessee
almost always results in forfeiture of the exemption, several states allow a
special lessee exemption for property owned by a nonqualifying entity
which is leased to a qualifying organization: Legislation granting exemp-
tions to property owned by profitmaking entities but leased to nonprofit
organizations and used for particular purposes was enacted in Connecti-
cut, Oregon, Texas, and Washington in 1977, and in California and New
Jersey in 1979. This might represent an incentive to obtain lower.rents.
Only the Oregon and Connecticut statutes related to religious institutions
as lessees.
Typical of those states which continue to deny exemption to property
owned by a profitmaking entity which is leased to a nonprofit organiza-
tion is Kansas, whose Supreme Court has declared that the renting of
property is a nonexempt use of it, and, therefore, is not being exclusively
used for charitable purposes.
In many cases, an exempt piece of property is only partially being
used for nonexempt purposes or used by a nonqualifying entity. Most
states under those circumstances permit apportionment of the property
as partially taxable and partially exempt. In at least two states, how-
ever,-Missouri and Nevada-even partial use for nonexempt purposes
results in total forfeiture of exemption.
ExCLUSIVE USE
Most states' statutes which grant real estate tax exemption to prop-
erty owned by religious organizations contain the qualifying phrase "and
used exclusively for religious purposes." Many of the courts across the
country which have construed the words "exclusively used" have inter-
preted them to mean "primarily" used. That is, so long as the primary
use of the property is for the stated purposes of the qualifying organiza-
tion, the property is exempt. Primary is distinguished from "secondary"
or "incidental" use of the property.
Despite the near uniformity in the use of the phrase "primarily
used," its application differs in various states. For example, in Order
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Minor Conventuals v. Lee,' a New York court found that the Franciscan
Fathers' use of unimproved land as a retreat was "fairly incidental" to
the purposes of the organization and, therefore, was primarily used for
religious purposes. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held
that nonuse of five-sixths of a university owned building did not prevent
the primary use from being educational. In Borough of Harvey Cedars v.
Sisters of Charity of Saint Elizabeth," a New Jersey court found that the
property in question was primarily used as a place of rest and relaxation
for nuns and clergymen and, therefore, not "reasonably necessary" to fur-
therance of religious purposes.
The requirement of "exclusive use" creates a question as to the sta-
tus of property which is not being used at all, but rather, is being held for
future and presumably exempt use. That question has been answered dif-
ferently by various states.
In 1979, Illinois legislation provided that property held by a city, vil-
lage, or county for future development is exempt. Similarly, a 1979 Maine
law exempted land owned by a nonprofit fire company where such land
was held in a land acquisition program. In 1979, the Florida Supreme
Court held that "vacant land held by a municipality is presumed to be in
use for a public purpose," and, therefore, exempt. The Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania held that thirty or forty acres of undeveloped land
surrounding a tax exempt retirement community were also exempt be-
cause they were reasonably necessary for expansion.
Conversely, the courts of New Jersey, Washington, Vermont, and
Arizona have denied exempt status to undeveloped lands because they
were not currently being used for exempt purposes or there were no es-
tablished plans for development within a reasonable time.
PARSONAGES
There is no noticeable trend toward cutting back the exemption for
parsonages among state legislatures. Several states recently have raised
the dollar ceiling on the parsonage exemption. In 1976, the Massachusetts
exemption was increased from $70,000 to $100,000, and in 1979, Rhode
Island and Colorado raised their ceilings by $40,000 and $10,000,
respectively.
Some states are more generous in their treatment of parsonages than
of residences and other facilities associated with nonreligious exempt or-
ganizations. Under Illinois law, parsonages are exempt, as are convents
and monasteries.
For another example, in Maine, 1977 legislation imposing user
* 64 App. Div. 2d 227, 409 N.Y.S.2d 667 (3d Dep't 1978).
" 163 N.J. Super. 564, 568-69, 395 A.2d 518, 520 (1978).
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charges on exempt property specifically exempted parsonages from the
imposition of such charges.
In other states, however, the courts and legislatures have been less
generous regarding parsonages than they have been in their treatment of
residences associated with nonreligious exempt organizations.
Pennsylvania, for example, does not allow the exemption for an "ac-
tual place of regularly stated worship and the ground thereto annexed
necessary for the occupancy and enjoyment thereof" to be extended to
parsonages. On the other hand, in Pennsylvania, a college president's
home may be exempt despite its similarity in use and function to that of
a minister.
In Kentucky, a minister's residence is exempt up to two acres. No
similar acreage limitation is placed on property of educational or charita-
ble organizations.
The question of what type of residence qualifies as a parsonage arises
occasionally. Some states require that there be a connection between the
residence in question and its occupant, and some identifiable, physical
church. The Tennessee Assessment Appeals Commission found that a
residence which belonged to the Church of God did not qualify as a par-
sonage because there was no physically embodied "church" with which it
could be associated.
In a 1978 Maryland case, the court denied exemption to a residence
owned by a religious organization because such residence was used as the
home of a minister whose primary occupation was to establish new
churches in the area. That is, he was not a minister for an identifiable
congregation, and, therefore, his residence was not connected with a par-
ticular church. The court interpreted a legislative amendment of the reli-
gious exemption which eliminated the words, "used in connection there-.
with," as eliminating the necessity of physical connection between church
and parsonage. The court stated that the amendment did not eliminate
the need, however, for an identifiable church associated with the parson-
age in question.
Wisconsin apparently does not require a connection with an identifi-
able church in order for a residence of a minister to be granted an exemp-
tion. In Sisters of Saint Mary v. City of Madison,' the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court found that the hospital chaplain, as "spiritual overseer" for
the hospital, was a qualified occupant and that it was therefore not
necesssary to establish that he was a pastor of a particular church.
A final issue in the area of exemptions for parsonages is the matter of
who is a qualified occupant. In Ohio, the rector's and the sexton's homes
do not qualify for exemption. In South Carolina, the home of the church's
' 89 Wis. 2d 372, 278 N.W. 2d 814 (1979).
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director of music and education was not a parsonage although the South
Carolina Supreme Court admitted that each church is not limited to one
parsonage.
Wisconsin law regarding qualified occupants of parsonages is rela-
tively liberal. By statute, church owned property occupied by pastors,
ordained assistants, members of religious orders and communities, or
ordained teachers is exempt. A pastor's widow, however, does not fall
within any of the above categories.
In 1977, North Dakota enacted broad legislation exempting resi-
dences as well as the necessary lands surrounding them, if owned by reli-
gious organizations and inhabited by members of such organizations who
devote most of their time to that organization's activities.
THE TREATMENT OF NEW RELIGIONS
The courts seemingly are reluctant to deny a religious exemption to
an entity which calls itself a religious institution solely on the grounds
that the entity is not a valid religion. Instead, they tend to deny such
groups exemption on other bases.
In In re Holland Universal Life Church of Love,6 the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania found that the property in question was not used
exclusively for religious purposes, as statutorily required for the exemp-
tion. The property was a residence which had been deeded to the Holland
Universal Life Church of Love but which continued to be used as the
residence of the grantor. Although "services" were held on the premises,
such use was not sufficient to qualify as "exclusively" for religious
purposes.
What is noteworthy about the Holland Universal Life Church of
Love case is that the court specifically declined to decide whether the
entity was a legitimate religious organization. It denied exempt status on
the basis of lack of "exclusive use." To determine the validity of a religion
as a religion is more controversial than to evaluate exclusivity of use. The
latter, therefore, is naturally a safer basis upon which to deny the
exemption.
Another case in which the exemption was denied to a "new religion"
is the Church of Right v. State of Washington Department of Revenue.
There, the property in question was deeded by the incorporator of "Over-
seer of Church of Right, and its Successors, a Corporation Sole," to the
"Church." The Board of Tax Appeals found that the property continued
to be used as a residence and was not set aside as a place of worship.
Although denial of exempt status was based on use considerations, it is at
least possible that the Board questioned the validity of the "Church" as a
6 38 Pa. Commw. Ct. 529, 394 A. 2d 665 (1978).
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religion in making its decision.
A final case whose facts and holdings are similar to the two above
described cases is In re Appeal of the Church of God at Memphis, in
which the Tennessee Assessment Appeals Commission found that the
property was used primarily as a residence for those individuals who gave
the property to the "Church," and for that reason, it denied exemption.
The Commission did note explicitly, however, that the only activity of the
church was to license other ministers of the church and that the congre-
gation, commencing in 1978 with seven people and growing to fifteen by
1979, was not sufficiently established to be an institution.
Some courts do deny the exemption directly on the grounds that the
organization is not a religion. For instance, the Missouri Supreme Court
denied exemption to property owned by the Church of Scientology be-
cause it found that the church was merely an applied philosophy with a
religious connotation rather than an actual religion. Exhibiting the "trap-
pings and accouterments of an organized religion" was not enough. To
qualify for the exemption, the organization, at a minimum, had to demon-
strate "a belief in and devotion to a Supreme Being."
Property of an organization which encourages religious beliefs may or
may not qualify for the exemption for religious institutions. The New
York courts, for example, have determined that Bible Societies are not
religious for property tax exemption purposes unless they can show a le-
gal relationship or direct association between activities and a recognized
religion.
In Illinois, an organization called the Inter-Varsity Christian Fellow-
ship Association, the stated purpose of which was to encourage belief in
Jesus Christ among college students, was granted an exemption as both a
religious and charitable organization. Apparently, encouraging religious
beliefs, at least beliefs in a well-established religion, may be sufficient for
purposes of finding that an organization is entitled to the exemption for
religious institutions.
IN LIEU OF "FEES AND USER CHARGES"
In order to enable municipalities to obtain funds needed for the pro-
vision of essential services, while at the same time maintaining property
tax exemptions, the legislatures of many states have enacted laws en-
abling municipalities to impose user charges on otherwise exempt prop-
erty. Such user charges are not substitutes for property taxation, but
rather, cover only those essential services for which the charges are im-
posed. Generally, user charges cover the costs of water and sanitation, fire
and police protection, and highway maintenance. They do not pay for ed-
ucation or welfare. User charges are not a new device, but now more and
more states are allowing their municipalities to impose them upon ex-
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empt property, and municipalities which had not previously imposed
such charges are now doing so. For example, in 1977, Vermont and Maine
enacted such legislation, as did South Carolina in 1978, and Connecticut
in 1979. New York enacted enabling legislation in 1971, but implementa-
tion of that law apparently has been delayed repeatedly.
A variation on the imposition of user charges is the authorization for
a municipality to accept "in lieu" payments. Generally, "in lieu" pay-
ments are made by the state to a municipality located on state owned
property. For instance, in 1977, New Jersey legislation authorized such
payments. A new application of "in lieu" fees may be seen in 1978 and
1979 legislation in Maryland and Colorado, respectively, under which
property owned by a governmental entity, but leased to a profit-making
organization retains exempt status, provided that the profit is shared with
the municipality.
Similarly, municipalities are attempting to disguise illegal taxation of
tax-exempt organizations as legitimate regulations. For example, the Vil-
lage of Justice in southwest Cook County, Illinois, capped 10 years of cre-
ative efforts to obtain revenue from local cemeteries by adopting an elab-
orate cemetery regulation ordinance. The result of the ordinance was that
the Village charged fees to pay for the cost of regulation and imposed the
regulation to ensure payment of the fees. The scheme has been struck
down by the courts, but the battle goes on.
In sum, the eighties will see increased pressure on the real estate tax
exemption. This pressure will come from more stringent application of
existing limitations on existing exemptions and more expansive construc-
tion of exemptions. We can also expect new kinds of limitational devices.
This trend should be viewed as part of the broader trend toward re-
ducing the tax advantages of exempt organizations across the board and
substituting government for the private sector in the provision of social
welfare and educational services. For the churches, this means an effort to
confine religion within the narrow perimeter of the church building itself.
It seems that the challenge for church lawyers is quite clear.
Before I conclude, I should state that this survey of what is going on
in the states has been made by looking at books and not by calling people
in the various states in order to find out what really is happening. The
survey, therefore, may be superficial in that respect, but I thought the
overview might be useful. If anyone has any corrections or additional in-
formation with respect to what is occurring in his or her state which the
published cases do not adequately reflect, I would be happy to hear from
you during the discussion.
Thank you.
